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The Merger of Statoil and Hydro Oil and Energy  
 
On October 1, 2007 two of Norway’s biggest and most powerful businesses, Statoil and Hydro joined 
forces to become StatoilHydro. Separately, Statoil and Hydro had been important players in the 
Norwegian oil industry, with strong and proud traditions of expertise and innovation reaching back to the 
early 1970s. Both Statoil and Hydro have influenced Norway’s development into a modern industrial 
nation. Today, Norway is not only one of the largest petroleum exporters in the world, but also a testing 
ground for technology development. The merger between Statoil and Hydro oil and energy has allowed 
for the giants to combine competence and superior technology as well as leverage the value created from 
implementing best practices from each respective player. Moreover, the merger has secured a financial 
solidity, and has increased their combined ability to take on risk in global business development. Shortly 
after the official merger date, the new organization was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange and the New 
York Stock Exchange with a market capitalization of NOK500 billion. This is equivalent to a value of 
U.S. $98 billion. 
The transaction involved a $30 billion share swap, and created an even strong competitor for oil majors 
such as Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron Texaco, Total and BP. Please refer to Exhibit 5 for an 
overview of the competitive situation and the industry landscape. The new StatoilHydro has a combined 
estimated production of 1.9 MMboe per day (million barrels of oil equivalent) and proved reserves 
estimated at 6.3 billion barrels of oil equivalent. As the dominant party in a horizontal merger, Statoil's 
shareholders would own 67.3% of the new company, and Hydro shareholders would own 32.7%. The 
Norwegian government, which now owns 71% of Statoil and 44% of Hydro, would own 67% of the 
combined company.  
Among the strategic goals for the merger is the creation of a leading international energy company with 
its base in Norway. Additionally, the merger will allow for more effective and safe operations, better 
resource use and overall growth in the international oil and energy environment as well as development of 
future energy sources. The merger of Norway's Statoil and the oil and energy division of Norsk Hydro 
will create the world's largest offshore oil and energy company, and it is expected to give the company 
significantly more power in developing international deepwater assets. Together, Statoil and Hydro have 
reputations for using cutting-edge offshore technology and combined, the new company would easily 
eclipse any other global offshore operator. Almost double the size of second-place offshore operator Shell 
and well ahead of Brazil's Petrobras, the merger had also given them considerable power for continued 
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international growth. The financial and benchmark graphs in exhibit 4 reflect the combined development 
of StatoilHydro from a 2005 starting point. 
Since the October 1, 2007 date, the merged business has grown from investments and acquisitions which 
include the acquisitions of oil sands leases in Canada in 2007 and the acquisition of the remaining share in 
the Peregrino field in Brazil in 2008. Additionally, StatoilHydro has been invited to participate in the 
Shtokman Development AG with a share of 24%. The Shtokman development is a natural gas field 
located in the Barents Sea in central Russia. Most recently, StatoilHydro has also signed a strategic 
agreement to jointly explore unconventional gas opportunities worldwide with Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation, the largest US producer of natural gas. Following this transaction, StatoilHydro acquired an 
initial 32.5% interest in Chesapeake's Marcellus shale gas acreage in the Appalachia region of the 
northeastern USA.  
 
 
 
 
 
Company Backgrounds  
Hydro was established in 1905 as Norsk Hydro-Elektrisk Kvælstofaktieselskab with the goal of producing 
nitrogen-based mineral fertilizer. The company pursued activities in fertilizers and metals until the late 
1960s until a surprising discovery in the Ekofisk field put oil on the Norwegian, and Norsk Hydro radar. 
Hydro participated in the discovery of the Ekofisk field in the late 1960’s early 1970’s. As the company 
evolved into a modern post-war industrial conglomerate, by the 1970’s it had new business areas in 
plastics, petroleum and metals (aluminum production).  Hydro had reached international expansion in all 
its business segments by the 1970’s. The 1990’s were also a good decade for Norsk Hydro, as they 
expanded successfully further into petroleum production and aluminum where they continued to grow and 
evolve until 2005. Despite its growth and successes over the decades, the millennium marked a new 
beginning for Hydro as management began reducing the company’s range of activity by divesting its 
historic fertilizer and industrial gas businesses into an independent company, Yara International. In 2007 
Norsk Hydro merged its oil and energy operations with Statoil to create StatoilHydro. At the time of the 
merger, Hydro operated 13 oil and gas fields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The merger allowed 
Discussion Question:  
1. What were the merger goals?  
 
2. What are the implications and potential challenges of the merger 
a. For the Norwegian Continental Shelf and the national industry structure? 
b. For the companies international activity and the global oil and energy industry? 
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Norsk Hydro a special focus on its now core aluminum business, thus making it a global, integrated 
aluminum company. 
Statoil, originally named “Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap A/S” was founded in 1972 as a private limited 
company owned by the Norwegian State. As such, the company's role was to be the government's 
commercial instrument in the development of the oil and energy industry in Norway. Statoil’s history of 
involvement in the oil industry began in 1972 with the discovery of the significant Statfjord field which 
was put into production in 1979. In 1981 Statoil was the first Norwegian company to acquire operator 
rights on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Gullfaks field). In the 1980s, both Statoil and Hydro became 
major players in the European gas market by obtaining large sales contracts for the development and 
operation of gas transport systems and terminals. Later in the same decade, Statoil became heavily 
focussed on developing their downstream manufacturing and marketing activities in Scandinavia, where 
they managed to establish a comprehensive network of service stations and did this by having acquired 
Esso's service stations, refineries and petrochemical facilities in Denmark and Sweden. Statoil was 
privatised in 2001 and subsequently listed on both the Oslo Børs and the New York Stock Exchange. At 
the same time its name was changed to Statoil ASA (StatoilHydro, 2007).At the time of the merger Statoil 
operated 29 oil and gas fields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.  
 
 
 
 
Planning 
 
While an organizational integration process consists of several stages, the first stage of planning and 
organizing the process is critical to the success of the merger and subsequent integration. Since the first 
stage of the integration process involves in-depth decisions about integration design and creation of a new 
and integrated organization, the establishment of integration principles, planning the actual integration 
process as well as identifying realistic ways of how to realize these goals, it is also critical that the 
delegation of this task goes to a group of experienced change agents. In this case, StatoilHydro’s planning 
process was initiated by the appointment of an Integration Planning Team headed by Hilde Merete 
Aasheim who came from the Hydro side of the merger. The overall goal of the IPT has been to develop a 
model for cooperation and to ensure a joint approach towards key issues arising throughout the 
Discussion Question: 
3.  If anything, what can you infer about the ambitions and attitudes to change for each 
     company based on their history? 
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integration planning process.  As figure 1 shows, the construction of IPT itself is a central part of the 
collaboration model. 
Prior to October 1, 2007 when the new and merged organization was put in place, an integration planning 
committee (IPC) headed by CEO Helge Lund had the overall formal responsibility. As shown in figure 1, 
IPT reported to IPC. IPT began its work immediately after the merger had been announced (late 
December, 2006) by appointing a bigger team of employee and management representatives from both 
Statoil and Hydro. IPT had 9 managers representing each organization, and together the 18 managers and 
5 selected employee representatives that were on board developed guiding principles to be used in the 
integration process. Promising equal opportunities for all employees regardless of prior organizational 
affiliation, the decided guiding principles included “openness, timeliness, involvement and dialogue". 
Four specific integration decisions and principles that had been communicated at the time of the merger 
announcement would serve as a foundation for IPT’s work. These are as follows: 
1) Helge Lund (Statoil) would be the CEO for the merged entity while Eivind Reiten (CEO of 
Hydro) would lead the board of directors 
2) The integration would be carried out based on values of equality between the two companies, and 
would hold equal possibilities for all employees regardless of originating company 
3) The guidelines, control systems and structures of Statoil would be put in place in the new entity 
and; 
4) The integration would draw on and take best practices from either company to create an overall 
improved company 
Communication for employees was prioritized with the creation of an integration web intranet called 
Entry, a weekly newsletter from the IPT manager as well as other written materials. StatoilHydro and IPT 
wanted to ensure that their most valuable resources were kept up to date and involved. Key stakeholders: 
customers, investors, employees and job seekers, media, shareholders, and stock market analysts were 
also quickly involved as StatoilHydro had a new website operational from the first day of the merger- 
October 1, 2007. The new website allowed for all communication regarding the new company to be 
channelled in a user friendly and streamlined manner to promote StatoilHydro and allow the audience to 
shape their own opinions.  
As of 2009, although the planning stage was well over, the IPT continued to manage and monitor the 
integration process from the top of the organization by encouraging implementation of the reorganization 
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throughout different levels and divisions within the organization and training middle managers in their 
important roles as change agents.     
Below is a diagram showing the various committees and groups in the integration planning process. 
Organization of the integration planning 2007 
Integration Planning 
Committee
IPC
Exploration & 
Production
Norway
Projects Natural gas
Functional
Teams (ex. 
Finance, HR, 
Comm, IT)
International 
Exploration & 
Production
Manufacturing
& Marketing 
Lead Integration Planning for each Business Area 
and develop new organization
Technology
& New Energy
Integration Planning 
Team IPT
• Project management
• Organization design
• Corporate center design
• Governance model
• Leadership & manning
• Collaboration with
unions
• Communication
• SOX
• Jurisdictional guidance
Lead the Integration Planning for each functional
area and develop new organization
Integration
Collaboration Forum
 
Figure 1: Organization of the integration planning 
 
The integration process was divided into two main phases to ensure effectiveness and safety as well as to 
protect the day to day operations. Where phase one was to deal with the integration of all the various 
entities on land, phase two dealt with the integration of the remaining operational units on land as well as 
those offshore. The goals of both phases were overall process improvement such as focussed resource 
utilization and better training and development methods.  
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1.3.
2007
1.8. 1.9.1.1. 1.2. 1.10.1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7.
18.12.
Announcement of 
merger intentions
3.5. 
EU-commision 
approves 
merger
19.3. Level 2 
leaders 
announced
29.1.
Collaboration
model is 
established
StatoilHydro integration phase 1
13.3. Boards approve
merger plan and 
corp name
5.7. Extraord. 
general assemply 
approve merger 
plans
23.8. 
Appointments to 
the StatoilHydro 
17.9. 
Over 9000  employees 
are positioned within 
the new organization 
1.10. 
"Day one"
15.5.
Level 3 leaders 
announced
21.6.
Level  4 leaders 
announced
 
Figure 2: Time line (Gravdal & Svendsen, 2009) 
Phase 2 of the integration took place in 2008 and 2009 and was organized in a similar manner, with IPT 
as responsible and a number of projects reporting to IPT for instance within EPN, M&M and NG. The 
different project groups worked out the organizational solutions for their business area. For instance, 
within EPN a project group worked out a new operational model during 2008 which was to be 
implemented in 2009. As the implementation date came closer, local implementation projects were 
established within each of the EPN divisions (such as Gullfaks, Statfjord etc). Hence the integration was 
organized in cascading projects, all ultimately reporting back to IPT.   
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Integration phase 1: Design of a new and integrated organizational structure 
 
In order to follow the principles of taking the best from both companies and equal treatment for all 
employees, IPT argued that a whole new organization needed to be created. All business areas and 
corporate staff were asked to develop proposals on a new organizational structure. IPT supervised, 
coordinated and aligned this input. Once the structure was in place, management positions as well as 
professional (and employee) positions required detailed job descriptions in terms of responsibilities and 
tasks. The number of people in each specific business area was also developed as a part of this process. 
See Exhibit 3 for new StatoilHydro hierarchy. 
As per the new StatoilHydro management framework, there were six levels of management beginning 
with top management CEO level (Level 0; CEO Helge Lund). The management structure at StatoilHydro 
has top management ranging from Levels 0 to 2, middle management ranging from Levels 3-5 and 
employee levels ranging beyond the sixth level. All Level 4 management positions began being assigned 
as of May 2008, once the managers in levels 2 and 3 had already been appointed.  
The focus of line management was on safe and efficient operation of their units in the demanding 
integration planning period, and all ongoing improvement activities in these units continued such that 
further improvement opportunities could be enabled with greater ease once the new company was fully 
established and operating.  
Standardization of administrative and operational work processes  
 
The standardization of work processes is common in horizontal mergers since the very definition of a 
Discussion Question: 
 
4.   How was the integration process organized? What are some alternative ways of organizing 
      such processes? Discuss pros and cons of different ways of organizing an integration  
      process. 
 
5.   Look closely at the third and fourth guidelines that were decided by the top management  
      team upon announcement of the merger. How would you seek to mitigate the apparent 
      contradiction to integrate the best practices from both while having the structure and control 
      systems of the larger (and more dominant?) organization? 
 
SNF Report No. 25/09 
8 
  
horizontal merger is “accumulating experience through merging common technology”. This implies 
merging work processes and best practices from the two merging entities.  
 
Standardization of work processes is in many ways one of the most tangible effects of the StatoilHydro 
merger. With respect to the design of work processes area in the integration, there has been a strong 
emphasis on identification, improvement and standardization of work processes within the new company. 
“The aim is to identify best practice from the former Statoil and Hydro companies and apply it to achieve 
improvements” (Bryne, 2008: 35). The organization however has decided to approach best practice in a 
two-pronged approach; administrative work processes from one side, and operational work processes 
form another. Specific administrative and operational work processes are listed in Table 1; these can be 
very generally understood as phase 1 encompassing the activities on the left, and phase 2 encompassing 
activities on the right. 
 
Table 1. Administrative and operational work processes of StatoilHydro 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The standardization of administrative routines in StatoilHydro took place during phase 1 and has gone 
very smoothly, as it has been quoted “those who participated in the integration work last year showed a 
formidable ability to cooperate”. Alternately, the standardization of the operative processes, and thus, the 
offshore processes for StatoilHydro has been taking place during 2008 and 2009 in what is referred to as 
integration phase 2. 
 
Administrative work process Operational work processes 
 Accounting and Control  Exploration (Oil) 
 Finance  Reservoir 
 Personnel  Drilling and Oil Well activities 
 Health and Safety Environment (HSE) 
 Concept Development and 
Engineering 
 Procurement and Supply  Operations and Maintenance 
 Information Technology and 
 Information Management 
 Marketing and Sales 
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As per the guidelines included in the merger agreement, Statoil’s original administrative work processes 
and IT systems will be used. The move Beyond Budgeting that had been initiated in Statoil would also be 
adopted by the new and merged organization. This meant that budgets would be replaced by a new and 
integrated control system. In term of operational work processes, the ambition has been to draw on the 
best practices from both companies.   
There has been a clear goal throughout the integration that the work processes (both administrative and 
operational) will be standardized and harmonized between units. The expected benefits of conducting 
business in this way are increased economies of scale, standardization gains, as well as identification and 
diffusion of best practice which results in reduced costs and increased effectiveness. Despite these 
positive effects, standardization can also be quite resource intensive and time consuming, for example in 
the development of joint standards and execution and training of new routines. Standardization also has 
the potential to temporarily reduce efficiency and production due to the learning curve, but also if it is met 
with resistance.  
 
Localization issues  
 
The integration and hence the growth of the company meant that challenges pertaining to geography and 
divisional locations would have to be targeted. As Statoil was the dominant partner, the corporate address 
of the merged entity was to remain in Stavanger.  
Decisions regarding localization of the main functions started with the location of business areas and 
corporate staff, followed by appointing leaders for these areas. Three of leaders have ties with Hydro, and 
five with Statoil. During this process it was determined that business activity would be distributed 
between Stavanger, Bergen and Oslo. This reduced the need to move and/or manage across geographical 
boundaries. However, a number of leaders had to relocate in order to get their first priority of choice in 
terms of new positions.   
The StatoilHydro merger agreement noted that the merged entity would build upon the organizational 
structure and guidance systems of Statoil. Thus in December 2007, the StatoilHydro business areas were 
delineated based on existing pre-merger business areas (as is noted in point 4.4 of the merger agreement). 
Four previously existing business areas would remain in new organization including Exploration and 
Production Norway, International Exploration and Production, Natural Gas, and Manufacturing and 
Marketing. The Technology and Projects area would be divided into two new independent areas, 
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Technology and New Energy, and Projects, and in addition, two new areas:  Chief Financial Officer Area 
and Corporate Staffs and Services would be added to the organization (Falkum et al., 2008). 
Over the coming integration period, almost all employees- on or offshore would experience that not only 
would their work tasks be subject to relocation, but they would have to share their work environments 
with new individuals and teams. For others still the changes would require moving altogether, or 
commuting during weekdays. Despite the top down encouragement to move or relocate, the governing 
principle of all StatoilHydro employees being promised a job remained. The section below describes how 
StatoilHydro dealt with the challenges of managing human resources in an environment when the number 
of overall positions and employees from the two companies was going to be reduced. 
 
Employee positions- “Indicate interest” process 
 
To further highlight the importance of the planning function of the IPT and the extent of planning prior to 
the official merging of the two companies in October 2007, it is helpful to describe the method by which 
personnel and the positioning of managers and professionals as well as resource surpluses were handled. 
In order to follow the governing principles originally outlined in the merger agreement of equal 
opportunities for all employees, all positions in the new and merged organization were open for all 
employees regardless of their previous organizational affiliation. 
 
The staffing process used by the IPT was called “Indicate interest”. The indicate interest process was an 
attempt tackle “who gets what jobs” in a fair manner as employees have had to report interest in select 
positions. Each employee could indicate interest for two positions, and employees were asked to rank 
their preference. The process was first launched in June. In order for existing employees to re-apply for 
their positions or alternate positions, there had to be a need for competence and capacity within the 
specific business areas, the underlying functions had to have been defined, and the need had to have been 
quantified. Employees could be assessed against one another such that the most competent and qualified 
person can get the job without falling subject to company biases.  “All lost their jobs, but all had a 
guaranteed new job” (Falkum et al., 2008). Eighty five percent of employees who had selected a certain 
position got their first or second priority through this process. With approximately 13,000 individuals 
(leaders and employees) requiring job placement within the new structure in phase 1, IPT established nine 
“Staffing Teams” consisting of a total of 140 members. Management had a clear ambition to fill positions 
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with a mix of employees from the two companies. Mixing a variety of competencies was expected to 
facilitate the transfer of best practices across units.  
 
Just like the staffing of professional (and employee) positions, staffing of middle management positions 
(Levels 3 and 4 in the management hierarchy) was done by having managers apply for positions in the 
new organization. Although a challenging task, StatoilHydro stayed true to its principles of equality and 
fairness throughout the merger process. As one employee put it: 
If no one was to lose their job, then all would have a position, and following the principle to 
take the best from both companies, we must therefore also make a new company where people 
from both Statoil and Hydro get new colleagues. We had to write out the whole company from 
new so as to be consistent with the principle regarding equality. 
 
The selection of top management positions was executed prior to opening the main re-staffing process for 
all employees. As an obvious result of merging, there would be fewer management positions in the 
resulting joint entity than in the two previous companies. “A staff surplus of 2,400 people (employees and 
consultants) was identified during the planning process for the merger” (Bryne, 2008: 37). As just one 
method to reduce the amount of applicants for these positions, retirement packages for interested parties 
over 58 years of age. However, those who considered early retirement could hold their decision until they 
knew what their new position would be – making the positioning process all the more challenging for the 
staffing teams. The retirement packages constituted a way of facilitating mobility in the organization, but 
due to the low unemployement rates in Norway at the time and the consistent efforts to get people to stay 
longer in their jobs (beyond the traditional retirement age), the 58+ was also for some people a bit 
controversial. According to his interview published in the internal magazine We, EPN leader Tore 
Torvund elaborated on the retirement packages by saying:  
The offer of early retirement for everyone aged 58 or above was one of several instruments 
chosen to tailor the organization to current and future requirements without undue impact. 
These instruments will also be deployed in the work on integration and restructuring for bases, 
land-based plants and offshore installations. (Bryne, 2008:37).  
 
Despite the removal of individuals 58 years of age and over from the applicant pool, there were still 1300 
internal applicants for the 400 management Level 3 positions available. Although this leads to a 
discussion of competence loss, knowledge transfer and the like, StatoilHydro recognizes the challenges 
streaming from it and has worked to minimize the disadvantages by extensive training programs.  
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Similarly, for management Level 4 there were 2800 internal applicants for 612 positions. In selection of 
the management team, it was necessary to have some managers move levels either upwards (through 
promotion) or downwards (through demotion) within the organization. Demotion and subsequent 
turnover is quite common in horizontal mergers, and it occurs for reasons attributed to higher complexity 
at the corporate level. Similarly at StatoilHydro, turnover can be expected to be higher among 
management than among employees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle Manager Involvement 
 
As the first stage in the merger involves planning and organizing and is usually undertaken by a 
specifically selected team of top management, ranked first and second levels of management for 
StatoilHydro, the second and third stages in the merger integration rely on the implementation of these 
decisions made in the first stage. This is done by middle managers (levels 3 to 5 in StatoilHydro).  
Since middle management takes on the critical role of change agent throughout the second and third 
stages of the merger process, there is a lot of pressure and expectation placed on this group. While it is 
assumed that middle managers across the board will possess at least some of these skills necessary for 
making the integration successful, some skills will be more prevalent than others. Preparing for this 
eventuality, StatoilHydro created a training program for its middle managers which dealt with identifying 
the skills most needed as a change agent. 
Discussion Question: 
6.   What kinds of decisions need to be made in the planning phase of an integration? Look at the 
      decisions that were made? What seems to be the basis and rationale behind the decisions? 
 
7.   Discuss the scope of the organizational changes that were triggered by the merger? Would these types 
      of changes be necessary in general in mergers? Should additional changes have been made? 
 
8.   Discuss the integration process in relations to the management literature you have been exposed to.  
      Do you think the IPT tackled the integration in a manner consistent with theoretical recommendations? 
 
9.   To what extent do you think the Scandinavian context and culture has influenced the decisions the  
       integration model. 
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In the first quarter of 2008, the concept of Leader Support in Change was launched and made public 
through various marketing methods although our key informant commented on the difficulty of increasing 
awareness and marketing the workshops to those middle managers they were intended for. 
The training program for middle managers was restricted to those geographically located in Norway, and 
publication of this was done on the intranet “Entry” as well as through the inside magazine “We”. Online 
registration using Entry was opened April 1, 2008 to middle managers operating primarily in the phase 
1domains, and regarding the phase 2 domains, the key informant noted that the offshore employees would 
have their own offer through Exploration and Production Norway later on. IPT sponsored the project with 
Hilde Merete Aasheim and Dordi Høyvik at the top.  
Returning to the important skills for middle managers to possess during the integration process, effective 
procedural and interpersonal skills, structure and coordination alongside good implementation of political 
skills are critical to offset any changes in productivity which may accompany changes in size of activity. 
These demands on middle managers come in the midst of a chaotic atmosphere of job redesign, and 
require middle managers to support their subordinates through both the stress associated with size 
redesign and mounting workloads. During standardization of work processes, communication skills are 
usually perceived to be the most important since there are large amounts of information being passed on 
from top management downwards through the organization since employees must know what affects 
them and how to progress in the new organization. Interpersonal skills are also critical at this time since 
middle managers must be aware employees are essentially relearning their jobs with new or modified 
processes and procedures. This period of learning can be an immensely frustrating time for 
employees and can contribute to loss of motivation and productivity.  
The relevance of this uncertainty element within StatoilHydro integration to middle managers is clear. 
Middle managers had to support their subordinates but at the same time were unsure of the security of 
their own management positions within the new organization. Operating with this uncertainty for several 
months was trying for both groups, since neither the middle managers nor employees knew who would 
make up the new subordinate groups. 
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Integration Phase21 
 
Outside research and media reports have thus far indicated that the organizational integration that took 
place under phase 1 was quite successful. The second phase of the merger integration, involving the 
operational units, commenced in December of 2007. Breaking the integration into two phases early on in 
2007 was done by the IPT to make the process more manageable. Recall that a central part of the 
integration had to do with mapping the best practices of Statoil and Hydro respectively, so that the 
process would be based on improvements overall and so that it would be perceived as fair by all 
employees. Despite fairness and equality being highly valued principles in StatoilHydro’s merger 
integration and despite being valued highly by the organization overall, phase 2 showed that these ideals 
are extremely difficult to secure in practice. The paragraphs which follow identify some of the challenges 
that have surfaced in the second phase of the integration.  
Employees in Exploration and Production Norway, the Natural Gas and Manufacturing and Marketing 
business areas were not significantly affected by the merger until phase 2.  The new common operational 
model that was developed for EPN triggered a much more controversial process during phase 2 of the 
integration. Requiring very large changes in the naturally less flexible offshore areas, StatoilHydro 
experienced substantially more resistance to (what was perceived as) the more radical changes taking 
place during phase 2 than they perhaps expected from their experience with phase 1. Where employees 
had been able to influence the process through their union representatives throughout phase one, reports 
in the media indicate that although the same collaboration model was formally employed, with union 
representatives in IPT, employees experienced the merger integration process as dictatorial and unfair in 
phase two with the whole process having been lead from a small team in EPN with guidance from IPT. 
                                                          
1
 All of the information concerning phase two is from publicly available media sources. 
Discussion Question: 
10.  To what extent is middle management involvement necessary in such processes and how should 
        middle managers (and the organization) prepare them for the integration. 
 
11.   What is the role of middle managers in implementing the changes? Linking back to the previous 
         Question, what kinds of tasks would you expect that middle management needs to be prepared for? 
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The offshore organization is characterized by cultural and historical differences in work operations 
between platforms, which made acceptance of common processes, systems and procedures a challenging 
endeavour. Some also focused their frustration and resistance on the decision making processes rather 
than the actual decisions that had been made. As a result of the merger, the various unions also began to 
compete for members offshore, which made for a challenging situation between the union organizations.  
Before the StatoilHydro merger, neither Statoil nor Hydro prescribed to any strictly standard way of day 
to day business in the offshore segment of the organization. Instead, all platforms and personnel followed 
idiosyncratic protocols due to contextual and historical differences. July 1, 2009 was the date 
StatoilHydro officially implemented the new process standardization and operational model offshore. 
This means that where prior to the StatoilHydro merger, integration between the platforms was low, after 
this date, all work on the Norwegian Continental Shelf will be organized according to the same 
organizational model and principles. The process for the reorganization and standardization changes is 
slated to take a year, ending in summer 2010.  
The new StatoilHydro operational model implied that all platforms were subject to standardization of 
work processes as well as introducing increased flexibility among personnel to have them rotate between 
installations. Among the changes that come with standardization of work processes are removing or 
significantly altering the individual work methods and platform cultures that exist. The staffing process (a 
new signal-interest process) will mean new managers for many, new colleagues, new work rules and 
regulations, it also means that some of the over 5000 employees working offshore will have to move 
platforms, while others will be serving and working on several platforms.  
The goal of the standardization is to make offshore activities safer and more efficient. Not only by making 
the Statoil and Hydro platforms more like but by standardizing all platforms could StatoilHydro ensure a 
more safe, secure and effective workplace for all involved. The high degree of contracted workers (non-
StatoilHydro employees) that perform tasks on a number of platforms accentuates the importance of 
streamlining work if possible. While some of the standardization can be attributed to the desire to 
integrate cultures for the new StatoilHydro, the most important thing was to bring all platforms, managers 
and employees back onto the same page. Sceptics of the standardization criticize the move and say that it 
is easy to believe that things can be made the same everywhere, however when no platform is alike, it can 
take substantial training to get them into the swing of day to day operations. There is fear and worry 
among the offshore staff that the ambition for standardization will be prioritized over safety. 
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The new operational model has set tempers a boil among the employees and the standardization and 
integration of work processes and platforms has been fraught with resistance, and discontent.  According 
to the Stavanger Aftenblad, they believe their needs have not been catered to, their voices have not been 
heard and are overall dissatisfied with the operational model chosen. Despite their displeasure, 
management insists they listened to the concerns of the offshore employees in creating the new model and 
used the summer of 2008 to iron out the details of the offshore integration model. The feedback from five 
quarterly work environment surveys (Integration Monitoring Survey) completed throughout the merger 
integration process (all administered by StatoilHydro) it is clear that the employees working offshore have 
at least temporarily lost trust in management, and they are not convinced that the information they receive 
is open and honest.  
Top and middle management have set off to tackle this dissatisfaction and slight foot dragging by 
explaining to their best abilities why they have chosen exactly this model. Management is doing their best 
according to the circumstances of this being the biggest offshore reorganization ever to take place. It is an 
enormous task and StatoilHydro has set a precedent; and whenever that happens it is bound to come with 
learning and trial by error. 
In terms of the platform reorganization goal the original intent was to reassign some 30 % of the offshore 
employees to different platforms than the ones they currently work at. This redistribution was supposed to 
enhance a common StatoilHydro culture as well as it was supposed to redistribute the employees 
according to strength, and qualifications. Similar to the “indicate interest” process that was followed in 
Phase 1, the offshore employees had a chance to announce their interest to move platforms, however this 
with an added incentive of a 60, 000 kroner if they did. Approximately 70% expressed their interest in 
moving should there be appropriate circumstances for a voluntary reassignment. Of 520 individuals 
eligible for the 58+ early retirements, 330 have used this opportunity and retired. Although the indicate 
interest process offshore attracted even more mobility interest than expected, some employees argue that 
they had no choice and that they would otherwise be moved by force.  
 
 
 
 
Discussion Questions: 
12. Compare phase 2 with phase 1. Why does integration in some of the operational units 
play out so differently?  
 
13. How would you handle the phase 2 integration (offshore) provided you were in top 
management or sitting in the IPT? If possible, draw on the theoretical tools and models. 
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Merger Goes International: StatoilHydro Canada 
 
2007 was a year of great change for oil operations in Canada as well. Not only was the North American 
Oil Sands Corporation (NAOSC) acquired by StatoilHydro, but at the same time, the merger between the 
two Norwegian entities was officially underway creating a challenging atmosphere. According to 
StatoilHydro Canada, the biggest issues were not the integration between Statoil and Hydro, but rather, 
the integration between a “Canadian” entrepreneurial versus a “Norwegian” multinational. To name just a 
few, StatoilHydro Canada perceived challenges in decision making processes, headquarter involvement, 
systems and procedure execution. 
As literature on international management asserts, firms growing “multinationally” will either want to 
focus on integrating activities across borders (global integration), or alternately, they will want to adapt to 
local needs. A common trade-off in cross cultural management, it is understood that the role of the 
foreign subsidiary will differ whether it is expected to transfer advantages, or develop those advantages. 
Those firms that are successful at a combination of global integration and local adaptation (at both 
transferring and developing firm specific advantages) will be recognized as holding a transnational 
strategy and will more often than not be developed as a center of excellence. This is the role that Canada 
holds since technology for heavy oil has been predominantly located here, and a center of excellence has 
been created as it focuses on developing technology for local needs while transferring heavy oil 
knowledge and competence across borders simultaneously.  
To address the complexity of dealing with a hybrid combination of roles in the Canadian subsidiary 
(securing the successful transfer of firm specific advantages while simultaneously ensuring a local 
approach to strategic challenges), StatoilHydro adopted a matrix organization structure. The preferred 
organizational structure for organizations characterized by complex control and coordination issues. 
Below we will see how the implementation of a matrix organization did not always ease any HQ-
Subsidiary challenges related to decision making processes, responsibility areas or cross border 
knowledge transfer. 
Below we will discuss some specific “culture” challenges that the StatoilHydro merger encountered in its 
international context. The decision making processes are often mentioned as one of the main areas the 
Canadian subsidiary has changed most with the acquisition and merger activity. According to some 
employees in Canada, the current decision making process is perceived as “highly consensus oriented”, 
which many perceive to be a Norwegian culture trait. Indeed the Norwegian culture is characterized by 
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lower power distances and a greater focus on group based decision making, and this can support the 
consensus orientation that emerged post StatoilHydro Canada integration.  
On a general level however, it is challenging for multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries alike to 
know what experience and competencies to draw on in terms of decision making when both parties have 
equally strong backgrounds, yet reflect different approaches and perspectives (local vs. company way). 
Where the matrix organization is designed to build local elements onto the existing company way, the 
decision making processes often becomes long, difficult and overly rigid. The rigidity arises from 
ensuring that the decisions are being made with the right information and expertise available, although 
ensuring that the right information and expertise has been consulted often involves allowing for lengthy 
discussion and input from all areas of the larger organization. Because in the case of StatoilHydro 
Canada, NAOSC originally went from being entrepreneurial and small with a staff count of under 100, to 
part of a massive global oil player with StatoilHydro, the new decision making process was not seen by 
the Canadians as adding value. Furthermore, because of their apparent weaker position as having been 
acquired, Canadian managers mentioned feeling excluded from the decision making process. 
 
Communication 
 
 
 
 
While the process and systems transfers were taking place with only minor glitches, the StatoilHydro 
Canada merger implementation had some more obvious hitches in the area of communication. Although 
there is a generally strong mutual respect between the Norwegian and Canadian cultures, part of the 
challenges within the firm specific advantages seemed to be related to cross cultural communication 
issues. Statoil and Hydro have very long proud histories rooted in Norway and while the Canadian culture 
is low power distance and relatively low context, it is still higher than Norway’s. This posed problems 
when communicating both verbally and on paper because the Norwegian manner of communicating is 
simply more straightforward and blunt and can easily be misunderstood as rude or abrupt. Alternately, the 
Canadian manner of communicating has British influence, which makes the language used more elaborate 
and “polite”.   
Discussion Question:  
14. How much of the consensus orientation do you attribute to changes following the merger and 
how much do you attribute to the Norwegian culture?  
 
15. What role do you think internal networks play in decision making processes? 
What 
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For the StatoilHydro team in Canada, the problems with cross cultural teams were magnified when it 
came to business communication in the form of meetings. Team members coming from different nations 
and backgrounds place special demands on managers, and this requires sensitivity to language differences 
and nuances, business protocols and time zones. With listening skills being so much more critical when 
you don’t have the benefit of face to face interactions, the effort is so much more demanding and 
important. Considering the 8 hour time difference between Norway and Alberta, meetings would not be 
possible to schedule during mutually conducive work hours. The Norwegian team would have to stay late, 
the Canadian team would have to come early, or there would be a little bit of both. Either way, someone 
always had to sacrifice. The Canadian team expressed their feelings about always having to come early 
and having to sacrifice family time as they felt they were doing more catering to the schedule than the 
Norwegians.  
 
 
 
 
Creating a Common Culture 
 
As part of the guiding collaborative principles throughout the merger, the creation of a common 
StatoilHydro culture was critical. Since Statoil had been the dominant partner in the merger, a name 
change from the original Statoil ASA was deemed appropriate so that the Hydro employees would feel 
fairly treated. StatoilHydro was adopted temporarily while the search for a permanent name and new logo 
for the merged entity went on. In early 2009 a new logo and name were revealed to the general public. 
Much to everyone’s surprise, the new name for the merged company was to be Statoil ASA, however the 
new logo would not retain any of its historic roots. (See exhibit 2).   
The name change created a good deal of sensation in the public sphere and media, although within the 
company it has not seen the same extent of attention. In fact, the typical “us and they” behaviours that so 
often create fissures between merging entities have not been central theme in the StatoilHydro merger 
process because so much of phase 1 integration work was focussed on building a new workplace for both 
companies based on the best of both organizations. Furthermore, there is no documentation or data that 
indicates cultural differences or new name being an important barrier in the integration process. 
Discussion Question: 
16.  How could this problem of communication be resolved such that it was mutually beneficial? 
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While cultural differences between Statoil and Hydro haven’t played important roles, there has been 
indication that during phase 2, talk of differences of a different kind surfaced. In Exploration and 
Production Norway, there has been a fair bit of back and forth regarding “differences between platforms.” 
Interestingly enough, the platforms in question are not specifically earlier Statoil or Hydro platforms, but 
rather strong platforms that stand out in one way or another that center the discussion around how the new 
operational model will function in practice with so many different models joining in. 
As goals of phases 1 and 2, the standardization of culture throughout the implementation and integration 
process was identified as a key challenge early on. To standardize while simultaneously  attending to 
flexibility and being open to positive differences can mean that standardization is overlooked in favour of 
correcting perceived flaws (or vice versa). Although it is too early in the merger to detect any such 
occurrences, this is important for StatoilHydro to monitor over the coming years. Creating a common 
culture should also not be isolated to just the company cultures of Statoil and Hydro in Norway. 
Remembering that together the international footprint of the merged organization was over 40 countries 
large, it is important for the new organization to create a unilaterally accepted culture that is universal. 
Watching these developments will also be interesting over the near future. 
 
 
  
Discussion Questions: 
17. Would it be reasonable to allow the standardization of culture to be defined in a manner that 
allowed for local allowances and variations? Or would these local adjustments sacrifice the 
goal of standardization? (a) in the Norwegian offshore context? (b) in the international 
context? 
 
 
18. As a final note on standardization, it can lead to the organization being locked in place and 
losing its ability to innovate. Does creating a common culture threaten the future long term 
capacity to change and innovate by focussing on standardization of processes, systems, and 
capabilities today? 
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Exhibit 1: Name change and new logo fall 2009 
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Exhibit 2: StatoilHydro Organizational chart as of August 2009 
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Exhibit 3: Financial Highlights  
 
StatoilHydro Annual Report 2008 
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Exhibit 4: Merger Progress Benchmarks 
StatoilHydro Annual Report 2008 
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Exhibit 5: The industry landscape (as per fall 2009) 
 
1
StatoilHydro in the industry landscape
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